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Forstater v CGD Europe & Ors) [2021] UKEAT 0105/20

Forstater v CGD Europe & Ors) [2021] UKEAT 0105/20

Ms Forstater holds gender-critical beliefs, which include the belief that sex is immutable and not to be conflated with gender identity. 

In other words, a person born as a man with XY chromosomes cannot become a woman, born with XX chromosomes.

She engaged in debates on social media about gender identity issues and, in doing so, made some remarks that some transgender people found offensive and “transphobic”. 

Some of her colleagues at work complained that they found her comments offensive, and, following an investigation, her visiting fellowship was not renewed. 

The Claimant complained to the Employment Tribunal that she was discriminated against because of her beliefs.

What is the law?

Section 4 of the Equality Act 2010 identifies people’s characteristics that are “protected characteristics”: age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation.  

Sections 5 to 12 of the Equality Act 2010 set out the circumstances in which a person “has” the relevant protected characteristic.

Section 10 of the Equality Act 2010 tells us what religion or belief means. 

(1) Religion means any religion and a reference to religion includes a reference to a lack of religion.

(2) Belief means any religious or philosophical belief and a reference to belief includes a reference to a lack of belief.

In a case in 2010, the Employment Appeal Tribunal defined a philosophical belief:

  1. The belief must be genuinely held. 
  2. It must be a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available.
  3. It must be a belief about a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour.
  4. It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance.
  5. It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others.

In a lower Tribunal, the Judge had held that Ms Forstater’s belief in the absolute nature of male and female qualified as a belief as per (i) to (iv) above but not (v). [See below for relevant excerpts of Mrs Forstaters witness statement and the comments of the first judge.]

In the Employment Appeal Tribunal, the Honourable Mr Justice Choudhury held that a philosophical belief would only be excluded for failing to satisfy (v) above if it was the kind of belief the expression of which would be akin to Nazism or totalitarianism and thereby liable to be excluded from the protection of rights under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). 

Ms Forstater’s gender-critical beliefs, which were widely shared and which did not seek to destroy the rights of trans persons, clearly did not fall into that category.  

Her belief, whilst offensive to some, and notwithstanding its potential to result in the harassment of trans persons in some circumstances, fell within the protection under ECHR and, therefore, within s.10, EqA.

So there you have it, in an Employment context, it is not an immutable fact that men and women are biologically distinct, but it is a protected belief.

You can find the full judgement here: 

https://www.gov.uk/employment-appeal-tribunal-decisions/maya-forstater-v-cgd-europe-and-others-ukeat-slash-0105-slash-20-slash-joj

Ms Forstater is Co-founder and Executive Director of “Sex Matters” here:

This article provides general guidance only and cannot be relied upon as legal advice: expert advice should be sought in relation to particular circumstances.

39. In the Claimant witness statement she stated: 

39.1 “I believe that people deserve respect, but ideas do not.” Para 5 

39.2 “I do not believe it is incompatible to recognise that human beings cannot change sex whilst also protecting the human rights of people who identify as transgender” Para 13 

39.3 “I believe that there are only two sexes in human beings (and indeed in all mammals): male and female. This is fundamentally linked to reproductive biology. Males are people with the type of body which, if all things are working, are able to produce male gametes (sperm). 

Females have the type of body which, if all things are working, is able to produce female gametes (ova), and gestate a pregnancy.” Para 14 

39.4 “Women are adult human females. Men are adult human males.” Para 15 

39.5 “Sex is determined at conception, through the inheritance (or not) of a 

working copy of a piece of genetic code which comes from the father (generally, apart from in very rare cases, carried on the Y chromosome).” Para 16 

39.6 “Some women have conditions which mean that they do not produce 

ova or cannot conceive or sustain a pregnancy. Similarly, some men 

are unable to produce viable sperm. These people are still women and 

men.” Para 17 

39.7 “I believe that it is impossible to change sex or to lose your sex. Girls grow up to be women. Boys grow up to be men. No change of clothes or hairstyle, no plastic surgery, no accident or illness, no course of hormones, no force of will or social conditioning, no declaration can turn a female person into a male, or a male person into a female.” Para 23 

39.8 “Losing reproductive organs or hormone levels through illness or surgery does not stop someone being a woman or a man.” Para 24 

39.9 “A person may declare that they identify as (or even are) a member of the opposite sex (or both, or neither) and ask others to go along with this. This does not change their actual sex.” Para 26 

39.10 “There are still areas of scientific discovery about the pathways of sexual development, including chromosomal and other “disorders of sexual development” (so called “intersex” conditions), and about the psychological factors underlying transgender identification and gender dysphoria. However I do not believe that any such research will disprove the basic reality that there are two sexes” Para 60 

39.11 “Under the Gender Recognition Act 2004, a person may change their legal sex. However this does not give them the right to access services and spaces intended for members of the opposite sex. It is an offence for a person who has acquired information in an official capacity about a person’s GRC to disclose that information. However this situation where a person’s sex is protected information relates to a minority of cases where a person has a GRC, is successfully “passing” in their new identity and is not open about being trans. In many cases people can identify a person’s sex on sight, or they may have known the person before transition, or the person may have made it public information that they are trans. There is no general legal compulsion for people not to believe their own eyes or to forget, or pretend to forget, what they already know, or which is already in the public domain.” Para 108 

39.12 “In most social situations we treat people according to the sex they appear to be. And even when it is apparent that someone’s sex is different from the gender they seek to portray through their clothing, hairstyle, voice and mannerisms, or the name, title and pronoun they ask to be referred to by, it may be polite or kind to pretend not to notice, or to go along with their wish to be referred to in a particular way. But there is no fundamental right to compel people to be polite or kind in every situation.” Para 110 

39.13 “In particular while it may be disappointing or upsetting to some male 

people who identify as women to be told that it is not appropriate for them to share female-only services and spaces, avoiding upsetting males is not a reason to compromise women’s safety, dignity and ability to control their own boundaries as to who gets to see and touch their bodies.”

The first instance Judge held:

The core of the Claimant’s belief is that sex is biologically immutable. There are only two sexes, male and female. She considers this is a material reality. Men are adult males. Women are adult females. There is no possibility of any sex in between male and female; or that is a person is neither male nor female. It is impossible to change sex. Males are people with the type of body which, if all things are working, are able to produce male gametes (sperm). Females have 

the type of body which, if all things are working, is able to produce female gametes (ova), and gestate a pregnancy. It is sex that is fundamentally important, rather than “gender”, “gender identity” or “gender expression”. She will not accept in any circumstances that a trans woman is in reality a woman or that a trans man is a man. That is the belief that the Claimant holds.”

“82. I accept that the Claimant genuinely holds the view that sex is biological and immutable. For her it is more that an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available. Even though she has come to this belief recently she is fixed in it, and appears to be becoming more so. She is not prepared to consider the possibility that her belief may not be correct. I accept that the belief Claimant goes to substantial aspects of human life and behaviour. 

83. I next considered whether the Claimant’s core belief that sex is immutable lacks a level of cogency and cohesion. It is avowedly not religious or metaphysical, but is said to be scientific. Her belief is that a man is a person who, if everything is working, can produce sperm and a woman a person who, if everything is working, can produce eggs. This does not sit easily with her view that even if everything is not, in her words, “working”, and may never have done so, the person can still only be male or female. The Claimant largely ignores intersex conditions and the fact that biological opinion is increasingly moving away from an absolutist approach to there being genes the presence or absence of which determine specific attributes, to understanding that it is necessary to analyse which genes are present, which are switched on, the extent to which they are switched on and the way in which they interact with other genes. However, I bear in mind that “coherence” mainly requires that the belief can be understood and that “not too much should be not expected”. A “scientific” belief may not be based on very good science without it being so irrational that it unable to meet the relatively modest threshold of coherence. On balance, I do not consider that the Claimant’s belief fails the test of being “attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance”; even 

though there is significant scientific evidence that it is wrong. I also cannot ignore that the Claimant’s approach (save in respect of refusing to accept that a Gender Recognition Certificate changes a person’s sex for all purposes) is largely that currently adopted by the law, which still treats sex as binary as defined on a birth certificate. 

84. However, I consider that the Claimant’s view, in its absolutist nature, is incompatible with human dignity and fundamental rights of others. She goes so far as to deny the right of a person with a Gender Recognition Certificate to be 

the sex to which they have transitioned. I do not accept the Claimant’s contention that the Gender Recognition Act produces a mere legal fiction. It provides a right, based on the assessment of the various interrelated convention rights, for a person to transition, in certain circumstances, and thereafter to be treated for all purposes as the being of the sex to which they have transitioned. In Goodwin a fundamental aspect of the reasoning of the ECHR was that a person who has transitioned should not be forced to identify their gender assigned at birth. Such a person should be entitled to live as a person of the sex to which they have transitioned. That was recognised in the Gender Recognition Act which states that the change of sex applies for “all purposes”. Therefore, if a person has transitioned from male to female and has a Gender Recognition Certificate that person is legally a woman. That is not something that the Claimant is entitled to ignore. 

85. Many trans people are happy to discuss their trans status. Others are not and/or consider it of vital importance not to be misgendered. The Equal Treatment Bench Book notes the TUC survey that refers to people having their transgender status disclosed against their will. The Claimant does not accept that she should avoid the enormous pain that can be caused by misgendering a persons, even if that person has a Gender Recognition Certificate. In her statement she says of people with Gender Recognition Certificates “In many cases people can identify a person’s sex on sight, or they may have known the person before transition…. There is no general legal compulsion for people not to believe their own eyes or to forget, or pretend to forget, what they already know, or which is already in the public domain.” The Claimant’s position is that even if a trans woman has a Gender Recognition Certificate, she cannot honestly describe herself as a woman. That belief is not worthy of respect in a democratic society. It is incompatible with the human rights of others that have 

been identified and defined by the ECHR and put into effect through the Gender Recognition Act. 

86. There is nothing to stop the Claimant campaigning against the proposed revision to the Gender Recognition Act to be based more on self-identification. She is entitled to put forward her opinion that these should be some spaces that are limited to women assigned female at birth where it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. However, that does not mean that her absolutist view that sex is immutable is a protected belief for the purposes of the EqA. The Claimant can legitimately put forward her arguments about the importance of some safe spaces that are only be available to women identified female at birth, without insisting on calling trans women men. 

87. Human Rights law is developing. People are becoming more understanding of trans rights. It is obvious how important being accorded their preferred pronouns and being able to describe their gender is to many trans people. Calling a trans woman a man is likely to be profoundly distressing. It may be unlawful harassment. Even paying due regard to the qualified right to freedom of expression, people cannot expect to be protected if their core belief involves violating others dignity and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for them. 

88. As set out above, I draw a distinction between belief and separate action based on the belief that may constitute harassment. However, if part of the belief necessarily will result in the violation of the dignity of others, that is a component of the belief, rather than something separate, and will be relevant to determining whether the belief is a protected philosophical belief. While the Claimant will as a matter of courtesy use preferred pronouns she will not as part of her belief ever accept that a trans woman is a woman or a trans man a man, however hurtful it is to others. In her response to the complaint made by her co-workers the Claimant sated “I have been told that it is offensive to say, “transwomen are men” or that women means “adult human female”. However since these statements are true I will continue to say them”. 

89. When in an, admittedly very bitter, dispute with Gregor Murray, who alleged that they had been misgendered by the Claimant, rather than seeking to 

accommodate Gregor Murrays legitimate wishes she stated: “I had simply forgotten that this man demands to be referred to by the plural pronouns “they” and “them”, “Murray also calls it “transphobic” that I recognise a man when I see one. I disagree”, “In reality Murray is a man. It is Murray’s right to believe that Murray is not a man, but Murray cannot compel others to believe this.” And that “I reserve the right to use the pronouns “he” and “him” to refer to male people. While I may choose to use alternative pronouns as a courtesy, no one has the right to compel others to make statements they do not believe.” 

90. I conclude from this, and the totality of the evidence, that the Claimant is absolutist in her view of sex and it is a core component of her belief that she will refer to a person by the sex she considered appropriate even if it violates their dignity and/or creates an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. The approach is not worthy of respect in a democratic society. 

91. I do not accept that this analysis is undermined by the decision of the Supreme Court in Lee v Ashers that persons should not be compelled to express a message with which they profoundly disagreed unless justification is shown. The Claimant could generally avoid the huge offense caused by calling a trans woman a man without having to refer to her as a woman, as it is often not necessary to refer to a person sex at all. However, where it is, I consider requiring the Claimant to refer to a trans woman as a woman is justified to avoid harassment of that person. Similarly, I do not accept that there is a failure to engage with the importance of the Claimant’s qualified right to freedom of expression, as it is legitimate to exclude a belief that necessarily harms the rights of others through refusal to accept the full effect of a Gender Recognition Certificate or causing harassment to trans women by insisting they are men and trans men by insisting they are women. The human rights balancing exercise goes against the Claimant because of the absolutist approach she adopts. 

92. In respect of the belief that the Claimant contends she does not hold, that everyone has a gender which may be different to their sex at birth and which effectively trumps sex so that trans men are men and transwomen are women. I consider that this is a good example of why, at least in certain circumstances, one needs to apply the Grainger criteria to the lack of belief, rather than the alternative belief. Believing that a trans woman is a woman does not conflict with the approach of the European Court of Human Rights in Goodwin, or the Gender Recognition Act, or involve harassment. It does not face the same issue of incompatibility with human dignity and fundamental rights of others as the lack of that belief does because that lack of belief necessarily involves the view that trans women are men. The lack of belief fails to meet the Grainger criteria. 

93. It is also a slight of hand to suggest that the Claimant merely does not hold the belief that transwomen are women. She positively believes that they are men; and will say so whenever she wishes. Put either as a belief or lack of belief, the view held by the Claimant fails the Grainger criteria and so she does not have the protected characteristic of philosophical belief.”

In a lower Tribunal, the Judge had held that Ms Forstater’s belief in the absolute
nature of male and female qualified as a belief as per (i) to (iv) above but not (v).
[See below for relevant excerpts of Mrs Forstaters witness statement and the
comments of the first judge.]
In the Employment Appeal Tribunal, the Honourable Mr Justice Choudhury held
that a philosophical belief would only be excluded for failing to satisfy (v) above if it
was the kind of belief the expression of which would be akin to Nazism or
totalitarianism and thereby liable to be excluded from the protection of rights under
the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).
Ms Forstater’s gender-critical beliefs, which were widely shared and which did not
seek to destroy the rights of trans persons, clearly did not fall into that category.
Her belief, whilst offensive to some, and notwithstanding its potential to result in the
harassment of trans persons in some circumstances, fell within the protection under
ECHR and, therefore, within s.10, EqA.
So there you have it, in an Employment context, it is not an immutable fact
that men and women are biologically distinct, but it is a protected belief.
You can find the full judgement here:
https://www.gov.uk/employment-appeal-tribunal-decisions/maya-forstater-v-cgd-
europe-and-others-ukeat-slash-0105-slash-20-slash-joj
Ms Forstater is Co-founder and Executive Director of “Sex Matters” here:
https://sex-matters.org/about-us/team/

This article provides general guidance only and cannot be relied upon as legal advice: expert advice
should be sought in relation to particular circumstances.

  1. In the Claimant witness statement she stated:
    39.1 “I believe that people deserve respect, but ideas do not.” Para 5
    39.2 “I do not believe it is incompatible to recognise that human beings cannot change sex whilst also
    protecting the human rights of people who identify as transgender” Para 13
    39.3 “I believe that there are only two sexes in human beings (and indeed in all mammals): male and
    female. This is fundamentally linked to reproductive biology. Males are people with the type of body
    which, if all things are working, are able to produce male gametes (sperm).
    Females have the type of body which, if all things are working, is able to produce female gametes (ova),
    and gestate a pregnancy.” Para 14
    39.4 “Women are adult human females. Men are adult human males.” Para 15
    39.5 “Sex is determined at conception, through the inheritance (or not) of a
    working copy of a piece of genetic code which comes from the father (generally, apart from in very rare
    cases, carried on the Y chromosome).” Para 16
    39.6 “Some women have conditions which mean that they do not produce

ova or cannot conceive or sustain a pregnancy. Similarly, some men
are unable to produce viable sperm. These people are still women and
men.” Para 17
39.7 “I believe that it is impossible to change sex or to lose your sex. Girls grow up to be women. Boys
grow up to be men. No change of clothes or hairstyle, no plastic surgery, no accident or illness, no course
of hormones, no force of will or social conditioning, no declaration can turn a female person into a male,
or a male person into a female.” Para 23
39.8 “Losing reproductive organs or hormone levels through illness or surgery does not stop someone
being a woman or a man.” Para 24
39.9 “A person may declare that they identify as (or even are) a member of the opposite sex (or both, or
neither) and ask others to go along with this. This does not change their actual sex.” Para 26
39.10 “There are still areas of scientific discovery about the pathways of sexual development, including
chromosomal and other “disorders of sexual development” (so called “intersex” conditions), and about
the psychological factors underlying transgender identification and gender dysphoria. However I do not
believe that any such research will disprove the basic reality that there are two sexes” Para 60
39.11 “Under the Gender Recognition Act 2004, a person may change their legal sex. However this does
not give them the right to access services and spaces intended for members of the opposite sex. It is an
offence for a person who has acquired information in an official capacity about a person’s GRC to
disclose that information. However this situation where a person’s sex is protected information relates to
a minority of cases where a person has a GRC, is successfully “passing” in their new identity and is not
open about being trans. In many cases people can identify a person’s sex on sight, or they may have
known the person before transition, or the person may have made it public information that they are
trans. There is no general legal compulsion for people not to believe their own eyes or to forget, or
pretend to forget, what they already know, or which is already in the public domain.” Para 108
39.12 “In most social situations we treat people according to the sex they appear to be. And even when it
is apparent that someone’s sex is different from the gender they seek to portray through their clothing,
hairstyle, voice and mannerisms, or the name, title and pronoun they ask to be referred to by, it may be
polite or kind to pretend not to notice, or to go along with their wish to be referred to in a particular way.
But there is no fundamental right to compel people to be polite or kind in every situation.” Para 110
39.13 “In particular while it may be disappointing or upsetting to some male
people who identify as women to be told that it is not appropriate for them to share female-only services
and spaces, avoiding upsetting males is not a reason to compromise women’s safety, dignity and ability
to control their own boundaries as to who gets to see and touch their bodies.”
The first instance Judge held:
The core of the Claimant’s belief is that sex is biologically immutable. There are only two sexes, male and
female. She considers this is a material reality. Men are adult males. Women are adult females. There is
no possibility of any sex in between male and female; or that is a person is neither male nor female. It is
impossible to change sex. Males are people with the type of body which, if all things are working, are able
to produce male gametes (sperm). Females have
the type of body which, if all things are working, is able to produce female gametes (ova), and gestate a
pregnancy. It is sex that is fundamentally important, rather than “gender”, “gender identity” or
“gender expression”. She will not accept in any circumstances that a trans woman is in reality a woman
or that a trans man is a man. That is the belief that the Claimant holds.”
“82. I accept that the Claimant genuinely holds the view that sex is biological and immutable. For her it is
more that an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available. Even though she
has come to this belief recently she is fixed in it, and appears to be becoming more so. She is not prepared
to consider the possibility that her belief may not be correct. I accept that the belief Claimant goes to
substantial aspects of human life and behaviour.

  1. I next considered whether the Claimant’s core belief that sex is immutable lacks a level of cogency and
    cohesion. It is avowedly not religious or metaphysical, but is said to be scientific. Her belief is that a man
    is a person who, if everything is working, can produce sperm and a woman a person who, if everything is
    working, can produce eggs. This does not sit easily with her view that even if everything is not, in her
    words, “working”, and may never have done so, the person can still only be male or female. The Claimant
    largely ignores intersex conditions and the fact that biological opinion is increasingly moving away from
    an absolutist approach to there being genes the presence or absence of which determine specific
    attributes, to understanding that it is necessary to analyse which genes are present, which are switched
    on, the extent to which they are switched on and the way in which they interact with other genes.
    However, I bear in mind that “coherence” mainly requires that the belief can be understood and that

“not too much should be not expected”. A “scientific” belief may not be based on very good science
without it being so irrational that it unable to meet the relatively modest threshold of coherence. On
balance, I do not consider that the Claimant’s belief fails the test of being “attain a certain level of
cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance”; even
though there is significant scientific evidence that it is wrong. I also cannot ignore that the Claimant’s
approach (save in respect of refusing to accept that a Gender Recognition Certificate changes a person’s
sex for all purposes) is largely that currently adopted by the law, which still treats sex as binary as
defined on a birth certificate.

  1. However, I consider that the Claimant’s view, in its absolutist nature, is incompatible with human
    dignity and fundamental rights of others. She goes so far as to deny the right of a person with a Gender
    Recognition Certificate to be
    the sex to which they have transitioned. I do not accept the Claimant’s contention that the Gender
    Recognition Act produces a mere legal fiction. It provides a right, based on the assessment of the various
    interrelated convention rights, for a person to transition, in certain circumstances, and thereafter to be
    treated for all purposes as the being of the sex to which they have transitioned. In Goodwin a
    fundamental aspect of the reasoning of the ECHR was that a person who has transitioned should not be
    forced to identify their gender assigned at birth. Such a person should be entitled to live as a person of the
    sex to which they have transitioned. That was recognised in the Gender Recognition Act which states that
    the change of sex applies for “all purposes”. Therefore, if a person has transitioned from male to female
    and has a Gender Recognition Certificate that person is legally a woman. That is not something that the
    Claimant is entitled to ignore.
  2. Many trans people are happy to discuss their trans status. Others are not and/or consider it of vital
    importance not to be misgendered. The Equal Treatment Bench Book notes the TUC survey that refers to
    people having their transgender status disclosed against their will. The Claimant does not accept that she
    should avoid the enormous pain that can be caused by misgendering a persons, even if that person has a
    Gender Recognition Certificate. In her statement she says of people with Gender Recognition Certificates
    “In many cases people can identify a person’s sex on sight, or they may have known the person before
    transition…. There is no general legal compulsion for people not to believe their own eyes or to forget, or
    pretend to forget, what they already know, or which is already in the public domain.” The Claimant’s
    position is that even if a trans woman has a Gender Recognition Certificate, she cannot honestly describe
    herself as a woman. That belief is not worthy of respect in a democratic society. It is incompatible with
    the human rights of others that have
    been identified and defined by the ECHR and put into effect through the Gender Recognition Act.
  3. There is nothing to stop the Claimant campaigning against the proposed revision to the Gender
    Recognition Act to be based more on self-identification. She is entitled to put forward her opinion that
    these should be some spaces that are limited to women assigned female at birth where it is a
    proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. However, that does not mean that her absolutist view
    that sex is immutable is a protected belief for the purposes of the EqA. The Claimant can legitimately put
    forward her arguments about the importance of some safe spaces that are only be available to women
    identified female at birth, without insisting on calling trans women men.
  4. Human Rights law is developing. People are becoming more understanding of trans rights. It is
    obvious how important being accorded their preferred pronouns and being able to describe their gender
    is to many trans people. Calling a trans woman a man is likely to be profoundly distressing. It may be
    unlawful harassment. Even paying due regard to the qualified right to freedom of expression, people
    cannot expect to be protected if their core belief involves violating others dignity and/or creating an
    intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for them.
  5. As set out above, I draw a distinction between belief and separate action based on the belief that may
    constitute harassment. However, if part of the belief necessarily will result in the violation of the dignity
    of others, that is a component of the belief, rather than something separate, and will be relevant to
    determining whether the belief is a protected philosophical belief. While the Claimant will as a matter of
    courtesy use preferred pronouns she will not as part of her belief ever accept that a trans woman is a
    woman or a trans man a man, however hurtful it is to others. In her response to the complaint made by
    her co-workers the Claimant sated “I have been told that it is offensive to say, “transwomen are men” or
    that women means “adult human female”. However since these statements are true I will continue to say
    them”.
  6. When in an, admittedly very bitter, dispute with Gregor Murray, who alleged that they had been
    misgendered by the Claimant, rather than seeking to
    accommodate Gregor Murrays legitimate wishes she stated: “I had simply forgotten that this man
    demands to be referred to by the plural pronouns “they” and “them”, “Murray also calls it
    “transphobic” that I recognise a man when I see one. I disagree”, “In reality Murray is a man. It is

Murray’s right to believe that Murray is not a man, but Murray cannot compel others to believe this.”
And that “I reserve the right to use the pronouns “he” and “him” to refer to male people. While I may
choose to use alternative pronouns as a courtesy, no one has the right to compel others to make
statements they do not believe.”

  1. I conclude from this, and the totality of the evidence, that the Claimant is absolutist in her view of sex
    and it is a core component of her belief that she will refer to a person by the sex she considered
    appropriate even if it violates their dignity and/or creates an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating
    or offensive environment. The approach is not worthy of respect in a democratic society.
  2. I do not accept that this analysis is undermined by the decision of the Supreme Court in Lee v Ashers
    that persons should not be compelled to express a message with which they profoundly disagreed unless
    justification is shown. The Claimant could generally avoid the huge offense caused by calling a trans
    woman a man without having to refer to her as a woman, as it is often not necessary to refer to a person
    sex at all. However, where it is, I consider requiring the Claimant to refer to a trans woman as a woman is
    justified to avoid harassment of that person. Similarly, I do not accept that there is a failure to engage
    with the importance of the Claimant’s qualified right to freedom of expression, as it is legitimate to
    exclude a belief that necessarily harms the rights of others through refusal to accept the full effect of a
    Gender Recognition Certificate or causing harassment to trans women by insisting they are men and
    trans men by insisting they are women. The human rights balancing exercise goes against the Claimant
    because of the absolutist approach she adopts.
  3. In respect of the belief that the Claimant contends she does not hold, that everyone has a gender
    which may be different to their sex at birth and which effectively trumps sex so that trans men are men
    and transwomen are women. I consider that this is a good example of why, at least in certain
    circumstances, one needs to apply the Grainger criteria to the lack of belief, rather than the alternative
    belief. Believing that a trans woman is a woman does not conflict with the approach of the European
    Court of Human Rights in Goodwin, or the Gender Recognition Act, or involve harassment. It does not
    face the same issue of incompatibility with human dignity and fundamental rights of others as the lack of
    that belief does because that lack of belief necessarily involves the view that trans women are men. The
    lack of belief fails to meet the Grainger criteria.
  4. It is also a slight of hand to suggest that the Claimant merely does not hold the belief that
    transwomen are women. She positively believes that they are men; and will say so whenever she wishes.
    Put either as a belief or lack of belief, the view held by the Claimant fails the Grainger criteria and so
    she does not have the protected characteristic of philosophical belief.”

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